Thursday, November 28, 2019

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Essays (731 words)

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder Imagine living in a fast-moving kaleidoscope, where sounds, images, and thoughts are constantly shifting. Feeling easily bored, yet helpless to keep your mind on tasks you need to complete. Distracted by unimportant sights and sounds, your mind drives you from one thought or activity to the next. Perhaps you are so wrapped up in a collage of thoughts and images that you don't notice when someone speaks to you. For many people, this is what it's like to have Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, or ADHD. They may be unable to sit still, plan ahead, finish tasks, or be fully aware of what's going on around them. If untreated, a child with ADHD is likely to cause disruptions and frustrations both at home and in school. He or she runs a high risk of having poor learning skills, low self-esteem and social problems that continue into adulthood. Today I would like to inform you about ADHD and the symptoms that identify this disability. Signs & Symptoms ADHD can only be identified by looking for certain characteristic behaviors inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. Although hyperactivity and impulsiveness are the best-known symptoms, some ADHD children are more dreamy and tuned-out than excessively active. Central to the disorder is the habitual inability to pay attention for more than a few minutes despite repeated requests or even punishment. The symptoms are usually noticeable by age 4-6 Inattention. People who are inattentive have a hard time keeping their mind on any one thing and may get bored with a task after only a few minutes. They may give effortless, automatic attention to activities and things they enjoy. But focusing deliberate, conscious attention to organizing and completing a task or learning something new is difficult. Hyperactivity. People who are hyperactive always seem to be in motion. They can't sit still. They may dash around or talk incessantly. Sitting still through a lesson can be an impossible task. Hyperactive children squirm in their seat or roam around the room. Or they might wiggle their feet, touch everything, or noisily tap their pencil. Hyperactive teens and adults may feel intensely restless. They may be fidgety or, they may try to do several things at once, bouncing around from one activity to the next. Impulsivity. People who are overly impulsive seem unable to curb their immediate reactions or think before they act. As a result, they may blurt out inappropriate comments. Or, they may run into the street without looking. Their impulsivity may make it hard for them to wait for things they want or to take their turn in games. They may grab a toy from another child or hit when they're upset. Not everyone who is overly hyperactive, inattentive, or impulsive has an attention disorder Unfortunately, there is no single or reliable test to diagnose ADHD since not everyone who is overly hyperactive, inattentive, or impulsive has ADHD.. successful diagnosis and treatment of ADHD depends on both medical and social factors. The American Psychiatric Association has established criteria for diagnosing ADHD that require doctors to evaluate the child's overall behavior. This evaluation should be based in part on reports from the child's family members and other adults, especially teachers, who have routine contact with the child The doctor should check for physical conditions such as vision or hearing problems, which could explain a child's inattentiveness and rule out other learning disabilities or physical disabilities that may seem like ADHD. A diagnosis of ADHD often leads to therapy with psychostimulant medications LIKE Ritalin.. This seems like a paradox: Why give stimulants to hyperactive children? Although these children may appear very hyperaroused, Internally they are underaroused. And therefore, the use of psychostimulants in the central nervous system actually results in an increased arousal and increased ability to focus and persist. Many doctors agree that the effectiveness of psychostimulants adds to evidence that ADHD is a neurological disorder, not a problem caused by poor schooling or parenting. Antidepressants, prescribed less often, are typically used for ADHD children who do not respond to stimulants or have adverse reactions to them. Statistics : It affects 3 to 5 percent of all children, perhaps as many as 2 million American children. Two to three times more boys than girls are affected.

Monday, November 25, 2019

The Metaphysics of John Stuart Mill in Relation to Philippine Government Essays

The Metaphysics of John Stuart Mill in Relation to Philippine Government Essays The Metaphysics of John Stuart Mill in Relation to Philippine Government Essay The Metaphysics of John Stuart Mill in Relation to Philippine Government Essay Essay Topic: Second Treatise of Government II. Table of Contents Chapter 1 Acknowledgement 3 Abstract 4 Chapter 2 Introduction 5-6 Theoretical Framework 7 Statement of the Problem 8 Thesis Statement Review of Related Literature 9-19 Chapter 3 Methodology 22-34 Presentation and analysis of Problems Q#1: What is the problem of the Self according to Nishida Kitaro? Q#2: What is David Hume’s concept of the Self? Q#3: What is the implication of their Metaphysical philosophies of the self to the centripetal morality of the Filipinos? Chapter 4 Summary 35-37 Conclusion 37-41 References 42-43 Chapter 1 Acknowledgement This is a discourse that is made for metaphysical study that brought enlightenment with the two different paradigms that explicate the essential attribution to the implication of the self to the Filipino. I would like to acknowledge the help of some people who made this research possible Dr. Segundo Sim for his direction, assistance, and guidance particularly in his recommendations and suggestions have been invaluable for the research. I also wish to thank Sir Garnace, who has taught me techniques of writing. Special thanks should be given to my classmates and colleagues who helped me in many ways. Finally, words alone cannot express the thanks I owe to my family for their encouragement and assistance. Abstract Although philosophical inquiries regarding the notion of the self bombarded through different elucidation of philosophers still encompasses the internal aspect of within as a metaphysical commitment which regard to the notion of the East and West paradigm. This paper aims to elucidate in comparative way the essential contribution of the philosophies of two different paradigms with the essential thought of metaphysical assertion. It entails the significance towards metaphysical endowment as a very profound distinction and similarities thru a bi polar elucidation regarding the concept of David Hume’s commencement of the self as no self at all, that everything underlies within the notion of impression, and that the self is no self at all. In Nishida Kitaro’s commencement he explicitly determined the stance of the self in the pure experience towards a nihilistic point of view which he determined that a self is a Basho or place, as an empty self. Towards the two philosophies of the self as a metaphysical genealogy intertwine the metaphysical through ethical relation of the centripetal morality of the actuality and the potentiality of the being ness of the Filipinos. Chapter 2 Introduction This paper aims to expose in a comparative way the ideas of Scottish philosopher David Hume and Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro both studies talks about the metaphysical understanding a propos notion of the Self and the repercussion to the centripetal morality of the Filipinos. A comparative way of explicating not leading to a chauvinistic elucidation but an affirmative thought between the two. Both thoughts consider the metaphysical attribution of the Self in a necessary relation determining the pursuit of the self or a person and the extraordinary conception of causation of beings. The unravel spirit of formulating thoughts regarding the diversity of the concept is a view of exhilarating the close door in a new light of horizon. The ideas of two different paradigms, the East and West have in a way the same conception that will elucidate their affinity and even the diversity will be serve somehow as an enlightenment, a determinant factor of a fascinating point of view of life in the meadow of philosophizing in a prolific manner. This will somehow shows a connection that will outpour the transcendental understanding of the self of an individual and the intertwining part towards morality. Thou, it implied denotes the bond within the necessary connection of the two paradigm will surely enlighten the reader in the spirit signification of a merely self of a person into a selfhood act to forsake what is the reality of the inter connection that purports the two representation and the metaphysical connection of the self and the pure experience as a notion that is necessarily for the convenience essentiality of this paper. The relationship of the self to metaphysics is the being of man that constitutes the whole embedded part of the ontological and transcendental aspect of one’s own essential attribute in the world. Man is a Self determining being, the place of the self to reality serve as a teleological concept, thou not genuine still emerge the possibility of the impossibility that takes place in the being ness capable of living. The teleological character of the unity we ascribe to the self is further illustrated by the puzzles suggested by the â€Å"alternate and multiple† personalities a connection of the past life to a new life as being the expression of aims and interests which were at least implicitly and as tendencies already present though concealed in the old connotation that will lead to uplift the individual self. The self implies and has no existence apart from a not self and it is only the contrast with the not self that’s aware of it self as a self. The feeling of self is certainly not an inseparable concomitant of all our experience. Self consciousnesses are source of weakness and moral failure. While we are steadily engaged in the progressive execution of a purpose we lose ourselves in the work, it is only upon a check that we become self conscious. Self consciousness in the bad sense always arises from a sense of an incongruity between the self and some contrasted object or environment. This paper will elucidate the two philosophies of the great philosophers which regard to self Theoretical Framework The researcher uses a theoretical framework to explain the concept of Nishida Kitaro and David Hume’s notion of the Self and its relation to the Centripetal Morality of Filipinos. The researcher will elucidate the two paradigm enable to have a grasp in the two different philosophies of the East and West and how they are connected to the centripetal morality of Filipinos. And through discussing what are the two diverse fields of a metaphysical philosophy the researcher will explicate the essential correlation towards the moral aspect in effect to the morality of Filipinos. Statement of the problem 1. What is the problem of the Self according to Nishida Kitaro? 2. What is David Hume’s concept of the Self? 3. What is the implication of their Metaphysical philosophies of the Self to the centripetal morality of the Filipinos? Thesis Statement The Metaphysical philosophy of Hume and Nishida is a manifestation of a life, a life that embedded a direct way of viewing the external exemplification to substantiate the discourse between the two, through the ordinary. An internal co relation to the external out view of the self towards the life of the Filipinos will surely afflict the individual of a person towards the being ness as an uninfringeable essential factor of one’s own self. There is no definite line of demarcation between self and not-self the self on its side consisting of me and the not self is social, the self on its side consisting of me and the not-self of other men. The self is essentially a thing of development and as such has its being in the time process. The nature of the experience is the concept of the self is based. The self is never identical with anything that could be found completely existing at any one moment in the mental life. Self is essentially an ideal and an ideal which is apprehended as contrasted with present actuality. They ought and the must also know nothing of the feeling of self. Review of Related Literature Kant’s concept of the self Kant’s concept of the self is a response to Hume in part. Kant wished to justify a conviction in physics as a body of universal truth. The other being to insulate religion, especially a belief in immortality and free will (Brooks 2004). In the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770, Kant corrected earlier problems of a non-material soul having localization in space. Kant used inner sense to defend the heterogeneity of body and soul: â€Å"bodies are objects of outer sense; souls are objects of inner sense† (Carpenter 2004). In Kant’s thought there are two components of the self: 1. inner-self 2. Outer-self (Brooks 2004). There are two kinds of consciousness of self: consciousness of oneself and ones psychological states in inner sense and consciousness of oneself and ones states via performing acts of apperception. Empirical self-consciousness is the term Kant used to describe the inner self. Transcendental apperception or (TA) is used in two manners by Kant for the term. The first being a synthetic faculty and a second as the â€Å"I† as subject. One will note that logically this function would occur in inner sense (Brooks 2004). Kant states that all representational states are in inner sense include all spatially localized outer objects. The origin or our representations regardless if they are the product of a priori or outer objects as modifications of the mind belong to inner sense. Kant presents apperception as a means to consciousness to one’s self. Inner sense is not pure apperception. It is an awareness of what we are experiencing as we are affected by thought (Brooks 2004). Brooks cites three types of synthesis. Kant claimed, there are three types of synthesis required to organize information, namely apprehending in intuition, reproducing in imagination, and recognizing in concepts (A97-A105). Synthesis of apprehension concerns raw perceptual input, synthesis of recognition concerns concepts, and synthesis of reproduction in imagination allows the mind to go from the one to the other. † (Brooks 2004). Unity of experience and consciousness are integral to the concept of the self. Transcendental apperception has function to unite all appearances into one experience. This is a unity based on causal l aws. There is a synthesis according to concepts that subordinates all to transcendental unity. According to Kant the contents of consciousness must have causal connections to be unified (Brooks 2004). Kant argues that in the present progressive one can be aware of oneself by an act of representing (Kant 1789). Representation is not intuitive but a spontaneous act of performing or doing things. Man knows that by doing and fulfilling activities that these impressions cannot be simply sensations resulting from the senses. Representation fulfills three acts. An act of representing can make one conscious of its object, itself and oneself as its subject; the representational base of consciousness of these three items. Becoming conscious of our selves is simply an act of representation and nothing more (Brooks 2004). Kant postulates that there is a plurality of representations that gives rise to our view of self as a â€Å"single common subject†. This concept requires a constant undivided self. This concept is a continuation of global unity that spans many representations, one does not have to be conscious of the global object but of oneself as subject of all representations (Kant 1787). Kant’s self has a unity of self reference, â€Å"When we are conscious of ourselves as subject, we are conscious of urselves as the â€Å"single common subject† [CPR, A350] of a number of representations. † (Kant 1787). Here Kant confirms that the impressions we perceive have one single common aim and that is the self as subject of these experiences. Kant postulates both senses as empirical but with the object of inner self being the soul. Transcendental apperception is a priori. Kant ma intains the use of intuitive faculties of intuition and synthesis in inner self where innate material unites the spatially located objects from the outer self. Here, this permits a downward deductive operation to act from Kant’s theology while preserving an inductive operation from the sense world of our experience. The Essential Self through the Essence and Existence With the concept of rationality, we found ourselves moving from questions about pure reality and back to questions about ourselves and our own activities. In deed with the concept of subjective truth, we found a renewed emphasis on personal questions, questions about self rather than questions about the world. What is the self? What is to be a person? What do you know when you ‘know your self? What is someone telling you to be when he or she tells you ‘just to be yourself†? Real self, a self that does not vary from context. Philosophers have called the real self the essential self that is the set of characteristics that defines a particular person. The experience of our real, or essential, self is familiar to us in a great many circumstances. Self as Consciousness What am I? A thing which thinks. What is a thing which thinks? It is a thing which doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, which also imagines and feels. The theory that the essential self of self identity is the mind or self consciousness can be traced back to ancient times, but its best known defender is the philosopher Descartes, who presented a simple but elegant argument that the individual self is the first thing that each of us can know for certain and that this self, which is indubitable is nothings else but the thinking self, the self that is aware of itself. Kierkegaard: The Passionate Self It is impossible to exist without passion, unless we understand the world exist in the loose sense of a so called existence. Eternity is the winged horse, infinitely fast and time is a worn out nag; the existing individual is the driver, that is to say he is such a driver when his mode of existence is not an existence loosely so called; for then he is no driver but a drunken peasant who lies asleep in the wagon and lets the horses take care of themselves. To be sure he also drives and is a driver; and so there are perhaps many who also exist. The Self as an Open Question If self identity is defined by our answer to the question who am i? One possible answer is nothing yet, nothing definite. If one sees the self not as an inner soul which is in us from birth, but rather as a product of our actions and thought, then self identity is something to be earned, not an already existing fact to be discovered. The existentialist Jean Paul Sartre (1905-1980) would say that all of those theories which take the self to be found in consciousness are misconceived, the self is not simply thinking, not is it memory of past. The self lies always in the future; it is what we aim toward as we try to make ourselves into something. But this means that as long as we are alive there is no self at least, no fixes and finished self. The self is an open question. What this means is that there is no real self other than the self that we make for ourselves. Kierkegaard’s language all choices are subjective truths, true for the person who makes them but not necessarily true for anyone else. The self is what each of us chooses for ourselves, our protection into our future, our intentions to become a particular kind of person. But as we never wholly achieve this for even when our ambitions are fulfilled we can always change our mind, formulate new ambitions, and so on the self never really exists in full. It is always at best. Alternative Conceptions of Self as Consciousness Plato has defined self in terms of rational thought as opposed to mere thinking, which can be rational or irrational. The Self in Contextualized Action (Shaun Gallagher and Anthony J. Marcel) We identify two forms of self-consciousness, ecological self-awareness and embedded reflection, that (1) function within the kinds of contextualized activity we have indicated, and (2) can be the basis for a theoretical account of the self. Both forms of consciousness are closely tied to action and promise to provide a less abstract basis for developing a theoretical approach to the self. To get clear about philosophical problems, it is useful to become conscious of the apparently unimportant details of the particular situation in which we are inclined to make a certain metaphysical assertion. (Wittgenstein) The self that we are does not possess itself; one could say that it happens' (Gadamer) Overt action is indivisible . . . . It is the whole i ndividual who acts in the real environment (Neisser) Surprising and seemingly counter-intuitive results are not uncommon when philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, employing a variety of first- and third-person approaches, search for an adequate model of the self. At least one philosopher equates the self with a momentary existence so that we are said to live through a large number of consecutive momentary selves (Strawson 1997). Other philosophers, introspectively exploring the stream of consciousness, fail to find anything at all that resembles a self (Hume 1739). When faced with a range of questions about self (questions pertaining to identity, experience of self, nature of self, and so forth) most theorists approach the topic in a manner that is abstract or detached from behavior and/or action normally embedded in contextualized situations. We also want to suggest that most of the controversies, problems, and paradoxes concerning the notion of self are the result of searching for the self within these abstract perspectives. We suggest a different starting point and strategy for developing models of a self which is more contextualized within the realm of action. First, we want to be clear that although this paper is centrally concerned with the nature of the self,   there is a necessarily related issue that we address, namely, the question of access to the self, and whether there can be certain forms of self-consciousness that are not abstractions from contextualized ituations. The promise of a sound basis for the development of a theoretical conception of a contextualized self is only good if in fact there are reliable forms of contextualized self-consciousness since the primary method for getting a grasp on the self is through first-person self-experience. Beyond this, however, the question of access is essentially l inked with the question of the nature of the self. Access (self-consciousness) is constitutive of self. Second, we wish to be clear that in sketching an approach to a conception of a self in contextualized action, we do not assume that there is only one kind of self or that an explanation of the contextualized self will be an explanation of every sense of self. Other approaches, such as the Meadian analysis of a socially constituted self, or the notion of an autobiographical self, can reveal important and valid conceptions of self. The Ethical Self What we want to call embedded reflection is not the same as the hyper reflective or introspective consciousness we identified in previous sections as a form of abstract, de contextualized behavior. We may state the difference in this way. Embedded reflection is a first-person reflective consciousness that is embedded in a pragmatically or socially contextualized situation. It involves the type of activity that I engage in when someone asks me what I am doing or what I plan to do. In such reflection I do not take consciousness or the self as a direct or introspective object of my reflection; I do not suddenly take on the role of a phenomenologist or theorist for the sake of answering the question. Rather I start to think matters through in terms of possible actions. I treat myself (I discover myself) as an agent. In such situations, my attention is directed not in a reflective inspection of consciousness as consciousness, but toward my own activities in the world where my intentions are already directed. Often my aim in such reflection is not to represent my self to myself, as if it were a piece of furniture in my mind, but to continue certain actions or to explain myself in terms of my action. What is the Self? The Numerical Self (Claro R. Ceniza) Two dimensions of identity of things; their generic and specific identities, on the one hand, and their numerical identities on the other. The generic and specific identities of object refer to their identities as classes, the generic identity having references to the larger class to which an entity belongs, and the specific identity referring to the lowest class to which the individuals belongs and this for our purposes could be the individuals itself. Generics identities may be arrange in a hierarchy of higher and higher classes, the highest class to which an individual belongs being called its SUMMUM GENUS that is in highest class. We may speak of identity in the sense of numerical identity. The numerical identity refers to the identity of individuals with itself. Numerical identity refers to the identity of an individual neither in terms of the classes to which it could belong nor to its properties, but to its history’s individual. For things, spatio- temporal continuities the general criterion although there are exception to this. For humans, memory is perhaps the ultimate criterion, although for ordinary cases. Spatio-temporal continuity is often regarded as adequate. Numerically one and the same. Another example is dotted lines obviously. These are not spatio-temporally continuous, but dotted lines may often be numerically distinguished from each other. With human the continuity of memory is more important than spatio-temporal continuity. When a person writes his bio-data, he more often than not to refer to his numerical identity and recounts his personal history and achievements as an individual. The greater importance of a continuous memory train as the more significant criterion for the numerical identity o persons is shown by the fact that, whether ones believes in it or not, the concept of reincarnation would be impossible, if not for the fact that the possible continuity of memory could be taken as more basic for The numerical identification of an individual, than spatio-temporal continuity, since clearly there is no spatio-temporal continuity between death of a previous embodiment and the birth of the next, spatio –temporal continuity is often considered adequate for the numerical identification of persons. We may regard the numerical identity of a person as his objective self. It is one’ self as seen by others, and as one sees himself objectively as part of a community of persons. What is the Self? The Generic Self The generic self of a person is the class or classes to which the person belongs, according to the way the custom has established these classes relative to him. Thus, a person may be classified as a father, a citizen, a teacher, husband, adult, etc. These classifications and the way he behaves accordingly are important to a person’s self-identity and self-identification and they usually determine his normal behavior, and what others expect. Confucius recognized the importance of role-playing in the society. He said that we all play roles in society- perhaps many roles for each one of us. A harmonious society is one where everyone plays his role at it should be played, according to the name given to that role. A person’s actions should be in accordance with the role or roles that he plays. A person is his roles, He may add to it the unique way he plays it well. Chapter 3 Methodology The researcher will use the comparative way of explicating the metaphysical philosophies of Nishida vis-a-vis Hume and the interrelation of the two philosophers to the centripetal morality of the Filipinos. All the materials are gathered from different libraries and internet research. A documentary abstraction guide will be used by the researcher as an instrument in gathering data. The researcher is able to come up to this topic because the essential part of being ness lies within the self, starts within the self before outpouring with the whole, a part that embedded the necessary significant towards metaphysical aspect to the paradigm of ethics. This study only discusses the definition, exposition of the comparative field of the East and West paradigm. For the philosophical metaphysics of Nishida and for Hume, the main idea regarding the two philosophers purports the essential connection imply with the centripetal morality of Filipinos. Analysis of Data The first level of discussion will discuss the metaphysical philosophy of Nishida and Hume. The second level of discussion will discuss the comparison and contrast, difference and similarities, of the Philosophers metaphysical thought and the relationship to the centripetal morality of Filipinos. Chapter 1 introduces the study. Chapter 2 discusses the different concepts philosopher regarding the self. Chapter 3 presents some concepts of the self and Nishida’s as well as Hume’s in relation to centripetal morality of Filipinos. Presentation and Analysis of Problems 1. What is the problem of the Self according to Nishida Kitaro? Nishida practiced Zen meditation in his early years and most of his work can be seen as an attempt to explore this experience. One of the fundamental questions that is considered between subject and object. His solution to the polarities of mind body, self world, me-other is to posit an original ground of existence that goes beyond such distinctions. In his first work, Zen No Kenkyo he writes variously on his topic: When one experiences directly one’s conscious state there is as yet neither subject nor object, and knowledge and its object are completely united, this is the purest form of experience. Why is love the union of subject and object? To love something is to cast away the self unite with that other. As emphasized in basic Buddhist thought, the self and the universe share the same foundation, or rather, they are the same thing. Nishida proposed a new thesis: that of ultimate reality as mu no basho, the place of absolute nothingness. Nothingness here corresponds closely to Nagarjuna’s concept shunyata or emptiness. This nothingness is not an absence of God or the self but an absence of quality, division or concept of all of the things which we need in order to define the separate existence of the ego self. By not being anything in particular, we are everything. Nishida eliminates the psychological terminology that had characterized his earlier work. Nishida’s Basho is a radically new concept. By imagining the self as Basho or place rather than as a point, consciousness or presence we move away from all ideas of individuality. Nishida sees in the extinguishing of the ego-self in the Basho the birth of the self as Basho. The basho has the power to unify the contradictions which underlie all existence, to effect the continuity of the discontinuity. In terms of Western logic, the basho violates the principles of contradictions and identity. Nishida claimed that the contradictions at the heart of everything were what caused the constant change and motion we observe in the universe. Only in the mu no basho are these dynamic oppositions reconciled. As a Buddhist, the ultimate good for Nishida is the realization of the true self, the Buddha nature. As a Zen Buddhist, Nishida argues that this realization should take place in he active world. His concept of acting intuition illustrates this the physical world of actions is expressive of the inner creativity of the basho. Only by living fully as historical individuals will the power of the self as Basho be made manifest. Nishida reminds us that â€Å"To study oneself is to forget oneself. To forget oneself is to realize oneself as all things. † For much of Japanese philosophy, in order to know our true self we must let go of the subject-object dichotomy with which we have been taken conditioned. We must let go of the voice of intellect in our pursuit and let our intuition open us up and allow awakening. In this awakening, not only do we awaken to our self, but we awaken to all reality. Before we look more closely at some Japanese Buddhist teachings, let us review some of ideas from the Neo-Confucian school. What can be constructed as the extreme positions with regard to the nature of the self? Self is an object or some thing Self is nothing Nishida Kitaro attempted to steer a path between these two extremes. For Nishida we cannot truly know the self if we take it to be either the subject or object of our knowing process. That is to say, the self is a place, or basho, that gives rise to knowledge. The self is neither the subject of an experience nor the object of knowing. The self is the experience discussing Nishida, Nishitani described this rapport between experience and self, â€Å"of which it is said not that there is experience because there is a self, but rather that there is a self because there is experience. † This confirms the long standing Buddhist teaching of no self. The actual self is a process. To this process, Nishida assigned a term, koiteki chokkan, acting intuition. Basho literally means â€Å"place† or â€Å"field† and suggests an all embracing environment within which all activity occurs. Because it is all embracing, this place o field is without boundaries and without a center of reference. Imagine an infinite circle without a circumference and without a center. As Yuasa stated: The basho is a fundamental restriction on being’ existence; without it, no beings can exist in the world. Even though basho is without boundaries, boundaries are in practice erected. They are constructed by our empirical self, or ego. Our empirical self, however, is not our true self, but instead the self as subject, a self –referential point of view whereby all else becomes the object for the empirical self. On other words, whereas Basho is a primordial field of oneness, discrimination now results from the construction of boundaries. The discriminating self, as subject, is not the true self. The genuine self, for Nishida and in line with Buddhist teachings, is thus a â€Å"self that is not a self. † This is why Nishida claimed that the self â€Å"lives by dying. † This is also why Nishida emphasized the faculty of intuition, not in a passive but in an active sense. It is through this active intuition that self realizes itself. Discursive, analytical knowledge is sufficient. For instance, consider the example of viewing a mountain. From one perspective the â€Å"I† is imbedded in a world of subject-object and mountain is the object of my knowledge. From another perspective, I realize the essential unity of all things. In this case, there is no subject-object duality, and the mountain is no longer separate from me. This native intuition maintains both perspectives at the same time. When this secret is mastered, living is dying and vice versa. Apparent contradictions are resolved. For Nishida, the self constitutes a unity of contradictions. Living is dying and dying is living. The opposition we normally pose between life and death is embraced in the Basho of self. We die and live at each single moment. This is the singular Buddhist truth of no substantiality; it reflects the paradox of our existence. When seem from our ordinary perspective, this paradox of life and death gives way to anxiety. When viewed from the perspective of the Basho of self, the paradox is embraced: My very existence is, therefore, an absolute contradiction, and it is this very realization that enables me to become truly self conscious. My individuality is my mortality, and my true nothingness is my immortality. I am a contradictory self, and my awareness of this is the ground of my religious awareness. Reality as Pure Experience, Nishida’s view is reminiscent of Zen Buddhism; he promotes Zen teachings using philosophical categories. Now Zen points directly to reality – what exists in its immediacy? Nishida viewed reality in much the same way; he directly pointed to pure experience as ultimate reality. Reality is that which underlies all our so called â€Å"experience. † We conventionally live in our ideas or images of the real, rather than in the real. Reality is the pure experience, which is the basis for conceptualization once conceptualization through reflection occurs, the experience becomes indirect. Reality remains the same unaffected by reflection. Reflection however gives birth to apparent modes of reality that are not in themselves truly real. When Nishida declares that reality is â€Å"pure experience† this means that reality within the present moment. Reality as Absolute Nothingness, all this is further sustained by his teaching concerning the primacy of â€Å"nothingness† over being. Absolute nothingness† is another phrase he ascribes to this pure experience. It is crucial to be aware that this â€Å"nothingness† is not the same as nihilism. Rather absolute nothingness transcends the opposition between being and nonbeing by embracing them. The term transcend can be misleading; it can give the impression of something beyond the realm of experience. The term immanent is also to be avoided becaus e it may lead to the impression of being immersed in our world if experience. Each of these terms implies the other. They each set up a dichotomy between being and nonbeing. Therefore for Nishida the preferred designation is absolute nothingness. Intellectual Intuition, a basic claim throughout Nishida is that we are able to directly experience this reality pure experience and absolute nothingness. The aim of his epistemology is to address more fully how this is possible. Nishida stressed an â€Å"intellectual intuition† that is able to acknowledge this reality. It is more of an immediate grasp of reality that is utterly transformative so much so that according to Nishida the experience is essentially religious. Our conventional or ordinary perception of thins is that we mistake what we conceive to be real with what is real. Yet what we conceive as being real is inspired by the force of our intellect and this drives us farther from the reality. Robert Carter’s metaphor of perching and flight is very appropriate: For Nishida to be aware of pure experience is not to deny conception and the various systematizations resulting from thinking but to ground them all in the original undifferentiated flow of pure flight. They are all perching and the only real error we make is to focus so fully on the perching the stable, fixed, resting places that we forget altogether how to fly. This ultimate reality points to the essential unity of all being. The awareness of this for Nishida religious consciousness. Nishida considered religion to be the fullest experiential integration of both world and self. This meant that God was equivalent to Nishida’s Absolute Nothingness. At the same time, God is also Absolute Being. Yet for Nishida, ultimate reality is not God, if by God we mean a separate self-subsistent reality. Neither is God an idea. God is this pure experience with out abstraction: And just as color appears to the eye as color and sound to the ear as sound so too God appears to the religious self as an event of one’s own soul. It is not a matter of God being conceivable or not conceivable in merely intellectual terms. What can be conceived or not conceived is not God. Nishida’s concept of the Self and Othe is that We can shift the focus from the action of the individual historical body to the interaction between distinct individuals, once again with the world as the mediating space of mutual formation. The relation between â€Å"I and Thou† was the first part that Nishida considered, although he continued to intertwine that relation with an internal relation in self-awareness. Where his previous analysis of individual self-awareness described it as a self-reflection of the universal of self-awareness, his description now incorporated the dimension of recognition. Each is a relative other to the self. . This other, recalling Nishidas notion of absolute, does not exclude the self; rather it constitutes self-identity as continually negating what it has been. Recognizing the absolute other within constitutes not simply a reflexive self-awareness but a self-awakening, a realizing of the â€Å"true self. † (Nishidas term jikaku translates as self-awakening, a Buddhist reading he undoubtedly intends, as well as self-awareness. ) Nishida allows for the Buddhist view that there is actually no self to awaken by referring to the self-awakening of absolute nothingness; its awaken ing is the awakening of the â€Å"true self. Absolute nothingness in action, as it were, entails a negation (of a substantial, self-same self) and an affirmation (of the true self). Nishida contends that toward the end of his life, perhaps thinking of the significance of death for understanding individuality, perhaps re-considering the theme of self-awakening as a kind of death and re-birth, Nishida delved deeper into the relation between the individual finite human self and the absolute or God. Experientially it comes to therefore in death. We will consider the meaning of death first, then the nature of God or the absolute in relation to the finite self. The theme of personal death is absent in Nishidas early work on pure experience and self-awareness, and mentioned only abstractly in essays on the historical world and the self, for example: â€Å"In absolute dialectics, mediation as absolute negation is mediation as absolute death, living by dying absolutely† Insofar as this is the finitude of the individual self, it also implies a logic of individuation where the role of other relative selves is dimished. If death is an ever-present opening, the other side of that opening so to speak is the absolute. To die is to stand vis-a-vis the absolute. If nothingness as opposed to being is implied, it is in the verbal sense of self-negating. The absolute arises through its own self-negation and inclusion of the relative self. God cannot be not wholly transcendent to or exclusive of the self or the world. To express the relation between a God and the relative finite self, Nishida introduces a new term, â€Å"inverse correspondence† or, we might say, contrary respondence (gyaku-taio). The more one faces ones death, the negation of ones life as an individual, the more acutely one is self-aware as an individual. The closer the finite self approaches God the stronger the difference between them becomes. This peculiar kind of relation implies that God and the relative self are inseparable but never dissolve into one another. If their distinction entails an undifferentiated source of their difference, an absolute nothingness, then the more that source is emphasized the stronger the distinction holds. 2. What is David Hume’s concept of the Self? The realization that the self can not be traced back to an impression is puzzling for Hume because on the one hand we have this feeling of our self but we also realize that we are to a certain extent always changing. Hume’s conclusion is that we are merely a bundle of impressions and that the self as something other than these impressions does not refer to anything. Hume believed that the entire contents of the mind were drawn from experience alone. The stimulus could be external or internal. In this nexus, Hume describes what he calls impressions in contrast to ideas. Impressions are vivid perceptions and were strong and lively. â€Å"I comprehend all our sensations, passions, and emotions as they make their first appearance in the soul. Ideas were images in thinking and reason. † (Flew 1962 p. 176). For Hume there is no mind or self. The perceptions that one has are only active when one is conscious. â€Å"When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. † (Flew 1962, p. 259). Hume appears to be reducing personality and cognition to a machine that may be turned on and off. Death brings with it the annihilation of the perceptions one has. Hume argues passions as the determinants of behavior. Hume also appears as a behaviorist believing that humans learn in the same manner as lower animals; that is through reward and punishment (Hergenhahn 2005). Skepticism is the guiding principle in what is no doubt non-recognition of meta-physics in this subject. Hume in the appendix to A Treatise on Human Nature addresses his conclusions (Hume 1789). In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, via, that all our distinct perceptions is distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connection among distinct existences. Hume’s method of inquiry begins with his assumption that experience in the form of impressions cannot give rise to the constancy of a self in which would be constant to give reference to all future experiences. The idea of self is not one any one impression. It is several ideas and impressions in itself. There is no constant impression that endures for one’s whole life. Different sensations as pleasure and pain, or heat and cold are in a constant continuum that is invariable and not constant. â€Å"It cannot therefore be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea (Hume 1789). It appears the closest thing that Hume could discuss as the self is similar to watching a film or a play of one’s life. These perceptions themselves are separate from one another and there is no unifying component as a self to organize such for long-term reference. Hume further deliberates over a position of identity of an invariable and uninterrupted existence. Hume confirms there is no primordial substance as to where all secondary existences of individual existence exist. Everything in our conscious state is derived from impressions. Objects in the outer world exist as distinct species that are separable from the secondary qualities in conscious thought. To negate any demonstration of substance Hume posits an analogy that if life was reduced to below that of an oyster, does this entity have any one perception as thirst or hunger? The only thing that would exist is the perception. Adding a higher complex of perception would not yield any notion of substance that could yield an independent and constant self. (Hume 1789). Hume’s model of the mind simply records data when such is manifestly conscious. The model abstracts and isolates objects and secondary qualities without any metaphysics. Unity of experience is one area, which Hume found elusive in his model and with such denied any configuration of self-reference only perceptions in the conscious (Hume 1789). He denies that we even have a self; all learning comes from sensory impressions. There does not seem to be a separate impression of the self that we experience, there is no reason to believe that we a self, thus it denotes a notion that there is no self at all. The idea of the self pass for clear and intelligible, one impressions that gives rise to every real idea but self or person is not any one impression. Self is supposed to exist after a reference, no impression constant and invariable. â€Å"I â€Å"can never catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perception is removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long an insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist. † Distinct† idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterested through a supposed variation of time; and this idea we call that of identity or sameness. â€Å"Distinct idea of several different objects existing in succession and connected together by a close relation and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a nation of diversity, as if there was no manner of relation among the objets†The nation of a self one soul is very likely s fiction â€Å"I am merely a bundle of perceptions. There is a consciousness of a continuing succession of experiences, but not of a continuing experiences; compatible view with the physicalist view of personhood. 3. What is the implication of their Metaphysical philosophies of the Self to the centripetal morality of the Filipinos? The Filipino Centripetal Morality denotes the elf as the basis of moral judgments and does the self as a standard. Filipino thought or diwang Filipino is generally an ethical or moralistic, predominantly socio-ethical, concrete and practical hence centripetal. Centripetal means â€Å"tending towards the center†. It refers then to people’s use of the SELF as the center and the basic commencement of the judgments. The Filipino moral judgment is understood as the people’s way of disclosing and explicating the golden precept the golden rule or mean which is base on living through moderate way. In Chinese term, this referred to â€Å"principle of measuring square†. Whatever measures you make is what you will be measured in return. Moreover, the implication is the centrality of the starting point which is the self always. The principle of non-moral judgment revolves around the self who is characterized by self-reflection and analysis. Eventually, this self-examination is an examination of the heart. Ultimately, Filipino centripetal morality considers the self as the standard by which one’s relationship with others ought to be regulated and ordered. â€Å"We† should do to others only that which is good to them and to us; â€Å"we† should not do anything detrimental to others and to ourselves. It demands a reciprocal between man and his fellowmen. That is men should not only mutually share the good but also mutually rid themselves of evil. Hence, one should know then so that you she or he knows other men. Because to know the good is to do the good. As what a used passage is that â€Å"Do unto others what you want others do unto you†. The transcendental self of a person, is the person identifies himself completely or well-nigh completely. The integrated summation of his ultimate values, the identity given is not generic identity wit the roles that he plays in his life ( it is even possible that he does not like the role or roles that he plays and therefore could not personally identify with them), nor with his numerical identity; for a person who knows who he is numerically, could still ask the question, who am I really? One’s transcendental is that which gives meaning and purpose to life the transcendental identity of a person is perhaps the more philosophically important the identity called transcendental because the answer usually lies beyond one’s self. The transcendental identity of a person therefore is generally other centered it is centered on what one regards as ultimate values the effect of that search for one’s Arche it is the being or concept that would integrate one’s life enables one to precede through life with at most certainty about his true Telos Since one transcendent identity is determinant of ultimate values. One’s ultimate concern is what gives meaning and direction to one’s life. One’s ultimate concern is what once identifies with completely. This is what one subjectively is without an ultimate concern one’s life is directionless and meaningless. Chapter 4 Summary Hume’s view on the Self and Nishida’s view on the Self The Affinity and Diversity HUME NISHIDA 1. These perceptions and impressions are identified by their self referential nature and that some perception of self seems to persist through time. This focal point of perception that continues through time and perceives its self in some fashion we choose to call me or I. . As a Buddhist, the ultimate good for Nishida is the realization of the true self, the Buddha nature. Nishida considered, although he continued to intertwine that relation with an internal relation in self-awareness. 2. This is known as Humes bundle theory of the self. Hume says, the mind has never anything present to it b ut the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. 2. Where his previous analysis of individual self-awareness described it as a self-reflection of the universal of self-awareness, his description now incorporated the dimension of recognition. Each is a relative other to the self. . 3. Hume means that we have no way of empirically establishing the independent existence of an external world, or what most of us call reality. The only world we can ever know is one of perceptions, ideas and experiences. 3. Nishidas notion of absolute, does not exclude the self; rather it constitutes self-identity as continually negating what it has been. Recognizing the absolute other within constitutes not simply a reflexive self-awareness but a self-awakening, a realizing of the â€Å"true self. † 4. Nevertheless, there are some that we are bound to accept in the everyday course of affairs. While they are ultimately approvable one needs these assumptions in order to function. a. such as the existence of the external world, b. the existence of other minds, c. The other minds have similar experiences as do you. d. the existence of the self, e. And the possible existence of some general intelligence pervading the universe. 5. Meaningful ideas are those that can be traced back to sense experience (impressions); beliefs that cannot be reduced to sense experience are not ideas at all, but meaningless utterances. Ideas are vague impressions of these impressions. No facts can be connected, proved, or explained by a priori reasoning. Space and time are the way in which impressions occur to us. Existence is not a separate idea. There is a distinction between matters of fact and relations of ideas. There is no power or necessity binding a cause to an effect. The mind is a bundle of impressions it is not a thing unto itself. . Nishida allows for the Buddhist view that there is actually no self to awaken by referring to the self-awakening of absolute nothingness; its awakening is the awakening of the â€Å"true self. † 5. Absolute nothingness in action, as it were, entails a negation (of a substantial, self-same self) and an affirmation (of the true self). â€Å"In absolute dialectics, mediation as absolute negation is mediation as absolute death, living by dying absolutely† Insofar as this is the finitude of the individual self, it also implies a logic of individuation where the role of other relative selves is dimished. If death is an ever-present opening, the other side of that opening so to speak is the absolute. To die is to stand vis-a-vis the absolute To express the relation between a God and the relative finite self, Nishida introduces a new term, â€Å"inverse correspondence† or, we might say, contrary respondence (gyaku-taio). The more one faces ones death, the negation of ones life as an individual, the more acutely one is self-aware as an individual. The closer the finite self approaches God the stronger the difference between them becomes. This peculiar kind of relation implies that God and the relative self are inseparable but never dissolve into one another. If their distinction entails an undifferentiated source of their difference, an absolute nothingness, then the more that source is emphasized the stronger the distinction holds 6. For Hume it is imagination, not reason or experiences that accounts for the persistent belief in the independent existence of an external world. Imagination ultimately overrides reason, and we cannot help believing in an independent, ordered, external world 6. The finite selves meets the asolute Nishida delved deeper into the relation between the individual finite human self and the absolute or God. Experientially it comes to therefore in death. We will consider the meaning of death first, then the nature of God or the absolute in relation to the finite self Conclusion The importance of the Self underlies the notion of essential attribution of being a ratio animalis towards the homo faber or towards the travel we seek to fonder through the capability of transcending our own selves into something, reaching the possibility of the impossibility as a creature of the being ness of God. The essential assertion of the two great thinkers enlighten the dark part of implicit notion regarding the individualistic one but develop the full potentiality that as a being we are capable of being different a unique creation. In David’s Hume Concept of the Self he denies that we even have a self; all learning comes from sensory impressions. These empirical notion that embedded a metaphysical configuration that there does not seem to be a separate impression of the self that we experience, there is no reason to believe that we a self, thus it denotes a notion that there is no self at all. The idea of the self pass for clear and intelligible, one impressions that gives rise to every real idea but self or person is not any one impression. Self is supposed to exist after a reference, no impression constant and invariable. â€Å"I â€Å"can never catch myself at any time without a perception and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perception is removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long an insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist. † Distinct† idea of an object, that remains invariable and uninterested through a supposed variation of time; and this idea we call that of identity or sameness. Distinct idea of several different objects existing in succession and connected together by a close relation and this to an accurate view affords as perfect a nation of diversity, as if there was no manner of relation among the objets†The nation of a self one soul is very likely s fiction â€Å"I am merely a bundle of percepti ons. There is a consciousness of a continuing succession of experiences, but not of a continuing experiences; compatible view with the physicalist view of personhood. In Nishida’s notion self is an object or some thing and self is nothing. The self is neither the subject of an experience nor the object of knowing. The self is the experience discussing Nishida, Nishitani described this rapport between experience and self, â€Å"of which it is said not that there is experience because there is a self, but rather that there is a self because there is experience. † This confirms the long standing Buddhist teaching of no self. The actual self is a process. To this process, Nishida assigned a term, koiteki chokkan, acting intuition. Basho literally means â€Å"place† or â€Å"field† and suggests an all embracing environment within which all activity occurs. Because it is all embracing, this place o field is without boundaries and without a center of reference. Imagine an infinite circle without a circumference and without a center. As Yuasa stated: The basho is a fundamental restriction on being’ existence; without it, no beings can exist in the world. Even though basho is without boundaries, boundaries are in practice erected. They are constructed by our empirical self, or ego. Our empirical self, however, is not our true self, but instead the self as subject, a self –referential point of view whereby all else becomes the object for the empirical self. On other words, whereas Basho is a primordial field of oneness, discrimination now results from the construction of boundaries. The discriminating self, as subject, is not the true self. The genuine self, for Nishida and in line with Buddhist teachings, is thus a â€Å"self that is not a self. † This is why Nishida claimed that the self â€Å"lives by dying. † This is also why Nishida emphasized the faculty of intuition, not in a passive but in an active sense. It is through this active intuition that self realizes itself. Discursive, analytical knowledge is sufficient. The comparative rapport which elucidates shows the diversity of both paradigm the perception regarding the self as a metaphysical boundaries because of the emptiness commencement of the place or the Basho and the no self which implicit denotes the impression of non-self. The divergence and similar view differs with regard to the concept of Buddhist connotation of dying, because the Western paradigm does not gives emphasis on such but the self as a bundle theory of impression per se. It shows the intertwine that sought to reality of the centripetal morality of Filipinos that we can see in everyday life. The way Filipino acts, thinks and live. But the challenge is that is really self nothing, is there really no self at all or is just a representation implying the fruitful transcendental aspect of living in the mundane, this a grasp that lies in individuality, in each one of us who has the ability to forsake the ambivalent way of living I the mundane part of our own being ness. The matter of our own body in realistic notion of living a spirited body and soul and the spirited soul which governs our body. The cause of everyday experiences is the long journey towards life as a traveling way of the right part in living the true horizon of governing towards God as the unifying substantive and essential creator of ours. In effect to the beyond port is the imaginative sort through reality and ideology which partakes individual preference to live trough eternally as a finite version of god enable for us to live in a natural and essentiality way of living throughout our own existence in an objective and subjective being ness. This serves as deeper commencement in metaphysical studies that everything rooted through metaphysical studies, thou the past is an end but an end without a period it is a comma that describes an everlasting continuation of learning a new field of knowledgeable affiliations, a modern period or even the time we have today, the contemporary age of today dealt with a big travails of accepting or disregard the information of learning by acquisition as an exemplary of the education per se but what really matters is the stability of being a rational individual capable of a moral altruism in thy self and towards the other that is the centrality of knowledge that even the longest period of time can not erase. The rise of the philosophy in metaphysical boundaries is the beginning of a continuous venture in life that is capable of acquiring new fruitful information that may influence our own individual personhood which regards a starting point of the endless point of learning through philosoph izing. We should not break or deconstruct what lies in our past what the history composed of because it helps us, the future sake to a more success venture regarding new discoveries that is why the modernization towards philosophy is a statue of wisdom. Thus, philosophy is a continuous process of learning through a rational state of existence. Remember that changes are not a hindrance for success. References Books Ayer, A. J. (1980). Hume, Oxford University Press Baillie, James (2000). Hume on Morality, Taylor and Francis Books Ltd. Burns, Kevin (2006). The Greatest Thinkers and Sages from Ancient to Modern Times, Arcturus Publishing Limited Ceniza, Claro R. (2001). Thought, Necessity and Existence: Metaphysics and Epistemology for Lay Philosophy, De La Salle University Press, Inc. Gaskin, J. C. A (1993). Dialogues and Natural History of Religion, Oxford University Press Masao, Abe (1990). An Inquiry into the Good, Yale University Press Mc Grea, Ian P. Greatest Thinkers of the Eastern World, Harper Collins Norton, David Fate (1993). The Cambridge Companion to Hume, Cambridge University Press Perry, John (1975). Personal Identity, University of California Press Pojman, Louis (2003). Theory of Knowledge, Wadsworth Thomson Learning Inc. Solomon, Robert C. (1996). Twenty Questions, Harcourt Brace and Co. Taylor, A. E. (1961). Elements of Metaphysics, Banes and Noble Inc. Internet webpages. uidaho. du/~ivan/phil-103/16. htm:July -28, 2007 http://mywebpage. netscape. com/AAVSO7550/david-hume-the-bundle-theory-of-the-self. html:July 28, 2007 http://legaltheory. tripod. com/humeandkant/: July 28, 2007 http://ccbs. ntu. edu. tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/james1. htm : July 28, 2007 http://fixedreference. org/2006-Wikipedia-CD-Selection/wp/d/David_Hume. htm :July 28,2007 http://www-rohan. sdsu. edu/faculty/feenberg/nshbkck. htm: August 04, 2007 http://plato. stanford. edu/entries/nishida-kitaro/#2. 1: August 04, 2007 http://pegasus. cc. ucf. edu/~gallaghr/tics2000. html : August 17, 2007 http://pegasus. cc. ucf. edu/~gallaghr/gallArobase00. html : August 17, 2007

Thursday, November 21, 2019

Technology Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words - 16

Technology - Essay Example It should be admitted that technology helps people to change the understanding of time and space dimensions (SlideShares, 2012). People are able to connect with each other for a few seconds and transform the information to any distances. For the modern society that is always busy and in need of a quick and easy way of exchanging information it is a huge advantage. Shopping, banking, game playing, messaging is considered to be a highly popular services today, that are used to make people’s life easier and more interesting. On the other hand, all this services may isolate person from a real life. The matter is that technologies may become an enormous part of people’s lives and lead to unpleasant implications (SlideShares, 2012). There are a lot of examples when person spends hours in front of his/her computer and occurred to be isolated from the society and his/her close people. That may cause some psychological problems and evoke a depression. One more important point is people’s communication. Modern society uses messaging, phone calls, e-mails for the sake of quick and comfortable social interactions (SlideShares, 2012). That is considered to be rather convenient way of communication that allows to be connected with family, friends and colleagues whenever and wherever person wants. However, mobile and internet communication leads to the lack of face-to-face interactions. That is remained to be a serious problem in modern society as it may cause problems with family and friends. Communication through technologies may evoke misunderstandings and reduce people’s desire for the face-to-face communication. In addition, it is important to mention the question of getting information from the technological devices. Television and internet are regarded as huge services for the presenting information to the entire world. People may find any data they need and updated the latest news with the help of technologies. That helps people to be

Wednesday, November 20, 2019

Leading Global Workforce Case Study Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words - 2

Leading Global Workforce - Case Study Example ernational standards of human resources by eliminating multi-faceted crises and issues among the individual participants in order to run a smooth and profitable show. For solving most of such workplace blockades, present day’s managers look for solutions that ensure a win-win outcome as the end result. This paper will discuss the importance of formulating value added reciprocal relationships between the leadership and employees by interpreting a workplace issue. According to the given case study, Fassler’s visionary approach to negotiate with the workforce strategies helped him overcome the economic crash. From there, he started experimenting with the diversification strategy in the product line. As a result, a retail chain of business helped him survive the SARS crisis in the airline catering ventures. The reason behind his survival was his ‘week on; week off’ payment basis during the recession. Fassler maintained great sense of enthusiasm to learn the food habits of neighboring countries like Korea and expanded his business from Salmon slices to Mushrooms. An innovative trade in party platters also worked well for him. During the years of business, he learned the techniques to predict the trends of the East Asian economy and adopted diversity in his product range across different marketing strategies over the fifteen years of time. As time makes way for him to retire, he is now worried about the future of the ‘Fassler Gourmet’. The very doubt about the cultural adaptability of the young engineers and their skills in making market predictions about the sales of the diversified food products makes it difficult for Fassler to take his retirement decision. Even though this one is not my own experience as an employee, I have good memory of it from my friend’s description. Coming far from East Asia to seek fortune in the United States, he had many personal problems to settle before he found a job in that company. After crossing the hurdles of everyday

Monday, November 18, 2019

Political Science Coursework Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 250 words

Political Science - Coursework Example Thus, denying the social media its freedom to air the content that is suitable for the public. The same applies to the content a person can upload on the internet since it will be monitored by the government and hence one is limited on the type and amount of content to share. Also, crucial information regarding the government is likely to be hidden from the public leading to people living in darkness. I agree with Shirky that both SOPA and PIPA are forms of censorship. This is because the government is in verge of monitoring everything being distributed which in turns denies the social media the freedom it deserves in running its business. Besides, it is an infringement of freedom of speech to American citizens since one cannot air their thoughts freely (Shirky, 2012). The media companies would want such bills passed into law for two reasons. First, they will have the freedom to produce and share their content freely. Secondly, it is not the government that will police their material and thus they will not be directly answerable to any violation that they make. Thus, the signing of the bill will affect the companies providing a way for media houses to create, produce and share their content. On the other hand, rejection of the bill will impact directly on media houses since they will have to directly answer to any violation. Either way, someone is going to be directly affected by the bill if signed or not

Friday, November 15, 2019

The Architectural Theory of Semiotics

The Architectural Theory of Semiotics This essay will examine the architectural theory of semiotics and its relationship to the built work of Peter Eisenman, specifically his project titled House VI. This essay will define the theory of semiotics from Saussure through to Chomsky. It will then go on to describe how Peter Eisenman, influenced by the writings of Noam Chomsky would apply semiotic linguistic principles to his design process namely those of deep structure and also syntactic transformational; expression. In doing so Peter Eisenman would set architecture on the path towards breaking free from drawing as the main vehicle for design. Semiotics in architecture is the search for a deeper discourse with the built environment, a way of understanding the rich array of metaphor, ambiguity, rhetorical nuance and metonymy that can occur in architectural meaning. A meaning that does not change and evolve over time dependant on specific context, convention or simple accidents.[1] It is the attempt at better understanding of just how a building communicates. The general study of signs was known as semiology in Europe and semiotics in the United States, it is these theories that have been applied to graphic and visual communication. Both the theories of semiology and semiotics appeared around the same time in the early 1900s. This new scientific approach to language and signs was proposed in Europe by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) and parallel to this in the United States by Charles Sander Peirce (1839-1914). Both were looking at the fundamental building blocks and structure of language, and the necessary conditions for language to exist.[2] Ferdinand de Saussure theorised the synchronic approach, that language should not only be looked at in its historical context but also in how it relates to a specific moment independent of its developmental context.[3] Differentiating between language as a system of enabling communication and the way language is used by individuals through speech. Saussure sought to discover and better understand the underlying principles of language, the structure and signs that all languages share.[4] Both Saussure and Peirce sought to understand the structure of signs, looking at the structure would facilitate a better understanding of how meaning was extracted from a sign. Peirce looked at the relationships of the structures as a way of categorising the signs.[5]The categories that Peirce divided signs into were Icon, Index and Symbol. An Icon bears a physical resemblance to the thing it represents, an Index represents a direct link between sign and object, and a Symbol relies purely upon the reader of the sign having learnt the connection to the meaning. Saussure determined the meaning of a sign by using what he called value. What was important for Saussure was the relationship between signs in the same system. He took a positive versus negative approach judging a sign by not only what it means but what it doesnt mean in relation to something else. For example a book is not a magazine or film.[6] Semiotics looks at the oppositional relationship of things as key to communication and cognition, undestanding something by understanding what it is not.[7]This signification helps to categorise reality so we can understand it. However Saussure was only concerned with language at not the part of the reader of language in the process, which contrasts with Peirce who believed that the sign is affected by the person who is reading the sign. It would be Roland Barthes in the 1960s who would take this theoretical idea forward. Barthes saw the science of signs as encompassing a much broader range of systems than just language. Barthes linked semiotics to any system of signs no matter the content or limits of that system. Semiotic meaning can be derived from images, sounds, gestures and objects. The system of signification could cover many forms of social and ritual convention.[8] The semiotic theories would also start to link with architecture. Architecture being similar to language in that it too is system of signs. A very obvious example of this would be to compare a house to a hospital, both buildings give off different signs as to their function and purpose. Our ability to read this purpose occurs much in the same way as a book is read and understood.[9] To distinguish architecture from building requires an intentional sign which suggests that a wall is doing something more than literally sheltering, supporting, enclosing; it must embody a significance which projects and sustains the idea of wallness beyond mere use, function, or extrinsic allusion. Thus its paradoxical nature: the sign must overcome use and extrinsic significance to be admitted as architecture; but on the other hand, without use, function, and the existence of extrinsic meaning there would be no conditions which would require such an intentional act of overcoming.[10] The crossover of linguistic semiotic theory with architecture would occur more thoroughly around 1966 when Peter Eisenman began looking at the work of Noam Chomsky.[11] Eisenman at the time viewed both language and architecture and being made up of three semiotic categories, these being semantics, pragmatics and syntactics. These three categories contain similarities to Peirce and his division of signs into icon, index and symbol. Semantics refers to the relationship between form and icon, pragmatics form to function and syntactics the relationship of physical form to conceptual space.[12]Eisenman was also interested in another idea closely related to the early theories of semiotics, that of structuralism. Using structuralist principles to go beyond function in architecture to discover the innate order of things, subverting simplistic readings of space by adding complexity through architectural semiotics.[13] It was through the reading of Noam Chomsky that the idea of deep structure became apparent to Eisenman as a useful means of investigating architecture. This syntactical opposition of line, plane and volume generated a physical architecture from a series of abstract rules. The essence of Eisenmans theoretical musings at this time would be distilled into his Houses project. The most thorough exploration of this would occur in House VI. House VI was commissioned by Suzanne and Dick Frank. A small building, it would be one of Peter Eisenmans first built works. Construction would take place between 1972 and 1975.[14] The building acts as a record of the abstract series of rules used in the process of design, with the Chomsky influenced theories of syntax and deep structure crucial to the transformative process. The building would become the manifestation of a system of relationships, with the system acting as generator of both form and meaning. The semantic generator of form is replaced by the syntactic. [15]The axonometric drawings dont just represent the house they become the house. As Eisenman states The diagrams for House VI are symbiotic with its reality; the house is not an object in the traditional sense that is the result of a process-but more accurately a record of a process.[16] The priority of the drawings in considering the house remove the pressure placed upon a finished building to deliver complete meaning. The building forms only a part of the conversation, as technical drawings are used to enhance the experience. Drawings and finished building-the entire process- should be viewed holistically, each providing an important summation of the architectural intent.[17] The axonometric drawings reveal the starting point for the design of House VI and the syntactic structure that these would form. The starting point is a cube divided by a four square and nine square grid. Eisenman then starts a series of simple movements of this grid in the process creating two centres. The hierarchy of these overlayed patterns develops the expressive interrelationship.[18]However rather than a further refining of this relationship, instead Eisenman materialises the expressions of the inherent geometries through axonometric sketches which turn the competing axes of the four and nine square grid into walls or voids cutting through the building.[19] In House VI Eisenman attempts to move away from the idea of function as the driving narrative of design, and along with this the overarching human scale design considerations which restrict architecture. This moves Eisenman towards an autonomous architecture, a conceptual matrix[20] that fragments the relationship between concept and percept. House VI seeks to place the viewer not at the end point of design but instead engaged actively in continual intrepretation and reinterpretation of process. This engagement with the viewer enables a reanimation of the process, a conversation between the viewer and the building that undermines the physicality of House VI as an object instead making it an active part of its surroundings. The concept at odds with the viewers historical perception of a general solidity normally associated with building.[21] Eisenman attempted to introduce an architectural system free of external reference, autonomous, not restricted by function and the classical notion of architecture as referential to the human body. Eisenman saw traditional architectures primary concerns being semantic through the linking of physical indicators to the external meaning, form and function. He viewed the possiblities of a semantic architecture as having been exhausted by both modernist and classical architecture. To unlock new variations in architecture the syntactic dimension needed to played with. Semantic architecture sought solutions to problems and was dependent on preconceived external requirements.[22]Through his exploration of linguistic theory the semantic became absorbed by the syntactic. It was Eisenman interest in Noam Chomsky as mentioned earlier that gave him the knowledge base to theorise a generation of form previously undiscovered by both classicist and modernist architecture. Form in its syntactic nature led to an antifunctionalism that enclosed any meaning generated by the form back within itself, creating an interplay of oppositions and empty positions.[23] House VI can almost be seen as design itself, with the rules the of transformational process inscribed within the final object. What these explorations into syntax sought to achieve was a design not limited by cultural preconceptions of function. These preconceptions Eisenman theorised were limiting the developmental possibilities of architecture. How could a design be achieved without being slave to the aesthetic experiences of the architect? Removing ego would allow for an exploration into multiple manipulations never previously conceived. Eisenmans work is driven by the continual process of thinking and rethinking both philosophy and architecture. It is an attempt to broaden the critical search for inspiration away from the architectural precedent by incorporating other fields of inquiry into the discussion. This reactivation of architectural dislocation moves it away from the complacent relationship of tradition, extending the possible search parameters of occupiable form.[24] The architectural development of Eisenman as an architect can be seen a continued battle against complacency in the profession. Eisenman sees House VI as still having the ability to provide shelter, the main driving function of the house. However this need is not pushed to the point of romanticism and nostalgia. The living room does not require the need to have a beautiful view, columns in the dining area do not hinder any activity in that area nor do they aid functionally or decoratively the area. The design of House VI is not driven by the need to accommodate every whim of its occupants, it is driven by the syntactic rules set out at the project start.[25] Critics of Eisenmans work suggest that his writings describing his theories do not describe his design process in a concise manner, that they deliberately ambiguous in order to allow Eisenman to close a critical examination. It is suggested that Eisenman uses jargon and rhetoric as a way to control the critical debate, to conduct it on his own terms. Eisenman can be seen as distancing himself from his own work, through the claims of an autonomous design process, the object is separated from creator.[26] Mark David Major and Nicholas Sarris criticise Eisenmans theoretical writings and the objects they refer to by suggesting that the theories arent quite of the analytical quality that Eisenman would have us believe, and the objects express more traditional notion than Eisenman would like. This is their cloak and dagger theory of Eisenman and his architecture. They describe Eisenman of using theories that cannot be objectively used to discuss other architecture, perpetuating a myth of Eisenman as architectural genius. Major and Sarris go on to describe Eisenmans writings of House VI as being closer to what is the architectural ideal rather than pursuing an analytical discourse. They suggest that Eisenman is doing both architecture and himself an injustice because rather than seeking to expose the application of the elegant and simple rules of composition used in the design of House VI he instead obscures them with rhetoric. Finally they put forward that the rules that Eisenman has laid out for himself do not strictly limit the architectural possibilities open to him and that aesthetic and tradition considerations could still subconsciously influence the design.[27] House VI acts as a commentary on architectural form, the principles of composition and the processes involved. Eisenman uses House VI to highlight the historical failures of architectural composition by highlighting drawings hold over the profession, but in doing this he limits the scope of his critique to traditional drawing based architecture.[28]The problem with drawing being in its ability to describe or show process. A finished architectural drawing becomes an object rather than an act of design. What Eisenman was attempting to achieve with House VI was the display of the design process, however paradoxically by displaying the process he in turn made it an image. The images can be reanimated through writing but the process itself is doomed to ambiguity. Eisenman used House VI to push at the boundaries between process driven design and drawing, but was ultimately limited at this time due to drawing being his primary medium of communication.[29]Eisenman saw the reliance on drawing as stumbling block in his search to free architecture from its emphasis on form and function. What he achieved with House VI however was for the first time to bring the industries reliance on drawing into question. House VI with its grids used a traditional method of architectural practice common since the Renaissance, but he managed to turn that process in upon itself revealing a infinite possibilities in turn made form utterly meaningless. The shifting priorities of design were brought forward with House VI and in doing so Eisenman shifted the future of architectural practice. Eisenman through his study and introduction of semiotics sought to not only break free from the not only the cultural practices of his profession but also its limiting historical traditions. Drawings role in the design process reached a visibility not seen before in architecture. House VI helped to define the limitations of drawing on the design process, by using an approach such as semiotics and applying it to the design process, drawing was held up in the spotlight. This led to the questioning of the role of drawing and attempts to seek other modes of representation. What Eisenman achieved with House VI was to pave the way for computational design, this was by no means the original intent with the idea of using computers not even thought of at this stage.[30] But in opening the architectural discipline up through the science of semiotics and the syntactic approach of House VI he enabled and eased of that future possibility to take place. Eisenmans buildings encourage exploration in architecture through the non-traditional means not as the only course of action but instead as an important alternative. [1] (Mallgrave and Goodman 2011) [2] (Crow 2010)p7 [3] (Mitrovic 2011)p148 [4] (Crow 2010)p15 [5] (Crow 2010)p30 [6] (Crow 2010)p41 [7] (Hattenhauer 1984)p72 [8] (Crow 2010)p54 [9] (Davies 2011)p24 [10] (Patin 1993)p88 [11] (Patin 1993)p91 [12] (Patin 1993)p88 [13] (Chapman, Ostwald and Tucker 2004)p389 [14] (Luce 2010) [15] (Patin 1993) [16] (Luscombe 2014)p560 [17] (Luscombe 2014) [18] (Luce 2010)p127 [19] (Luce 2010)p129 [20] (Luscombe 2014) [21] (Luce 2010)p132 [22] (Patin 1993)p89 [23] (Patin 1993)p91 [24] (Benjamin 1989)p50 [25] (Benjamin 1989)p51 [26] (Major and Sarris 1999)p20.2 [27] (Major and Sarris 1999)p20.4 [28] (Luce 2010)p132 [29] (Luce 2010)p132 [30] (Luce 2010)p134 Bibliography Benjamin, Andrew. â€Å"Eisenman and the Housing Tradition.† Oxford Art Journal Vol.12, 1989: 47-54. Chapman, Michael, Michael J Ostwald, and Chris Tucker. â€Å"Semiotics, interpretation and political resistance.† Contexts of Architecture. Launceston: ANZAScA, 2004. 384-390. Crow, David. Visible Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics in the Visual Arts. Lausanne: AVA Publishing, 2010. Davies, Colin. Thinking About Architecture. London: Laurence King Publishing, 2011. Hattenhauer, Darryl. â€Å"The Rhetoric of Architecture: A Semiotic Approach.† Communication Quarterly, 1984: 71-77. Luce, Kristina. â€Å"The Collision of Process and Form.† Getty Research Journal No.2, 2010: 125-137. Luscombe, Desley. â€Å"Architectural Concepts in Peter Eisenmans Axonometric Drawings of House VI.† The Journal Of Architecture, 2014: 560-611. Major, Mark D, and Nicholas Sarris. â€Å"Cloak and Dagger Theory.† Space Syntax Second International Symposium. Brasilia: Bartlett School of Graduate Studies, 1999. 20.1-20.14. Mallgrave, Harry F, and David Goodman. An Introduction to Architectural Theory 1968 to the Present. Chicester: John Wiley and Sons, 2011. Mitrovic, Branko. Philosophy for Architects. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2011. Patin, Thomas. â€Å"From Deep Structure to an Architecture in Suspense: Peter Eisenman, Structuralism, and Deconstruction.† Journal of Architectural Education (Taylor Francis, Ltd) 47, no. 2 (November 1993): 88. Sargazi, Mohammad Ali. â€Å"Explaining the Meaning of the Symbols in Architectural Semiotics and Discovery.† Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Vol 1, 2013: 129-134.

Wednesday, November 13, 2019

An Inspector Calls :: English Literature

An Inspector Calls: Set In 1912; written 1940's but a play for the millennium. What important issues are raised by the play? How does Priestly use the Settings, Characters and Events to convey? I've been studying the play 'An Inspector Calls' that is concerned about problems and issues of year 1912 and used the characters of the play to allow his feelings of the time to be put across to others, in 1912 and now. Many of the problems faced then are still around today and will be probably will be in years to come, despite him trying to make changes in the way we think. However the play was wrote in 1946, just after the Second World War, he was trying to make people aware of what was going on and how this shouldn't happen again. At the time there were a lot of coal miners on strike for having low wages, working, living and conditions also Dockers for the same reasons nothing was done. The poor were manipulated by the rich into what they wanted, for instance take the World War Two Germany the much stronger, powerful and richer country, against poorer countries such as Poland and there was many more countries in similar situations. The play was attempting to get across, that we need to look after the people and things around us no matter how small, as it's not acceptable to use them to our advantages: Remember this. One Eva Smith has gone but there are millions and millions of Eva Smith and John Smiths still left with us. There were always people there to look after or at least realise about the 'Eva Smiths' in the world. In a world scale other countries came into help the poorer countries but notice its always too late in a way, people have already been hurt, In the play there was Sheila and Eric Birling and of course the inspector. A more recent event like this took place in 1982, the Falklands. Argentina invaded the Islands, thinking nothing would be done because they're so small. The British advanced to help their fellow men, and stopped the conflict in its tracks. They made Argentina pay for it, in the death of their own men, 'then they will be taught in fire and blood and anguish', The Inspector (page 56). I think the ideas of Priestly were heard by the people, but still have not embedded themselves into today's society: Nonsense! You'll have a good laugh over it yet. We've been had, that's all. Birling(both p70) This is only Mr Birling's general opinion but this could also be the